Adam Smith and Judicial Categories

So we had previously discussed the question of why the Gemara in Sanhedrin considers Theft and Damages(גזילות וחבלות) to be a separate category from Admissions and Loans(הודאות והלוות).

Rav Marcus gave two possible reasons then:

1. Theft and Damages usually involve violence or threat of violence, while Admissions and Loans usually involve trickery or misunderstanding
2. Theft and Damages started with an illicit act, while Admissions and Loans start with a perfectly legal arrangement and only become a problem later on

I'd like to suggest some other possible answers(I actually made a previous attempt at this, which to my mind wasn't very successful), but to get there we'll need to take a detour to the 18th century in the still young United Kingdom...

Adam Smith on Robbery and Contracts

Vernon Smith’s recently discussed Adam Smith’s “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” on Econtalk. One of his points was Smith's theory of the relative severity of different legal categories:

Vernon: And he also points out that, in that development, that theft and robbery carry a greater punishment than a violation of promises. In other words, contracts. And he says, Why? He says, because robbery and theft take from us what we have already acquired. Violation of contract merely frustrates our expectation of gain. Okay? And he says that's different. And indeed, theft and robbery are criminal offenses. Violation of contract are only civil offenses. You can get redress, of course, but they are considered less serious. And he gets that from another fundamental proposition in Adam Smith, and that's the asymmetry between gains and losses.

Russ: It's incredible.

Guest: He says, we suffer, and I can tell you this one almost verbatim: He says, 'We suffer more when we fall from a better to a worse state than we ever gain when we arise from a worse to a better.' And he goes on, explains this, that it's loss of fortune, of reputation, of esteem. I mean, it isn't just money and fortune. He mentions, as I recall, three other things, but they have to do with our rank, our status

Russ: People don't pay as much attention to us. And that's a huge factor for Smith.

Guest: Yes. And we will be very careful to avoid that. And so this notion of the asymmetry between gains and losses is not only clearly stated more than one place in Adam Smith, but it's actually used to derive some of his results.

Smith distinguishes between theft and contract violation based on the severity of suffering imposed on the victim:

• Theft takes away what a person has—diminishing their status, which has a profound effect on a person socially/psychologically
• Violations of contract take away expected gains—also no fun, but at least the person’s current status is preserved

We can formulate a similar distinction with regard to our Sugya, focused on the effect on the victim:

• Theft and Damages- take away what a person has, causing them great suffering
• Admissions and Loans- take away property they expected to gain or, in the case of loans, money that they regarded to some degree as “extra” because they were willing to loan it out at zero interest as the Torah proscribes. This presumably causes them a lesser degree of suffering.

An Anthropological Explanation

So this is an interesting distinction, but I think we can delve a bit deeper. There is something just more basic about cases of Theft and Damages than Admissions and Loans(and Theft vs. Contract Violations too, for that matter). Here I'd like to draw on a distinction Professor Roberts makes in his book "How Adam Smith Can Change Your Life":

Before Einstein discovered relativity, before Rodin sculpted The Burghers of Calais, before the Eiffel Tower and the Chrysler Building, before Brutus of Troy founded Lon­don, before the first human being realized you could plant a seed and wait for it to grow, before the ambition deep within us caused all these changes in the human condition, we were, it appears, hunters and gatherers in small bands and clans. Subsistence was the most one could hope for, and it was not easy to achieve. Life was fragile; death came early and often.

In such a world, how we interacted with those around us made the difference between life  and death. There was no insurance company to insure your spear. There was no government to provide disability payments if you broke your leg chasing dinner. People must have leaned  heavily on each other. Trust was essential. Failure to chip in, to help out, to do your share must have been punished relentlessly and cheaply, through shame and anger the first time, but eventually with expulsion and exile if such behavior contin­ued. Every family, every extended family, and maybe every band and clan shared what they had with each other out of necessity.

The point is that some of our societal rules are conventions that evolved to cooperate better as part of human culture. To put it bluntly, a young child, or even an ape, understands the concept of Theft and Damages. One individual takes something from another or hits another--we understand that as wrong institutionally at the most basic of levels.

Admissions and Loans, on the other hand, are another story. Our child or primate would be hard put indeed to understand the obligatory power behind a verbal commitment or the obligation to return a loan once it's been given. As Jonathan Haidt's quote of primate expert Michael Tomasello goes:

It is inconceivable that you would ever see two chimpanzees carrying a log together.

Our unique Human ability to cooperate with one another by means of complex social conversions is something that belongs more to the realm of Culture than to the realm of Instinct(though Haidt argues there is also an innate component). Admissions and Loans belong to this category. Theft and Damages are a more basic part of our psychology, that because they are wrong in a more universal sense.

The Reason Behind Writing a Sefer Torah

The second half of Rav M's shiur on the mitzva of writing a Sefer Torah, focused on the rationale behind the mitzva. The main chakira revolved on this question:

• To Learn: is the purpose of the mitzva that you will have a sefer Torah ava?
• To Connect: or perhaps it's something more akin to the King's obligation, which seems to be more about creating a relationship with the Torah: וְהָיְתָה עִמּוֹ, וְקָרָא בוֹ כָּל-יְמֵי חַיָּיו--לְמַעַן יִלְמַד, לְיִרְאָה אֶת-יְהוָה אֱלֹהָיו, לִשְׁמֹר אֶת-כָּל-דִּבְרֵי הַתּוֹרָה הַזֹּאת וְאֶת-הַחֻקִּים הָאֵלֶּה, לַעֲשֹׂתָם. The writing it oneself is in order to develop a more personal relationship with the Torah.

1. Buying a Sefer Torah

The first nafka mina is whether one can fulfill his obligation by buying a sefer torah.

The Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvot(עשה יח) mentions the possibility of buying a sefer torah, but with the possibility of writing it oneself being a greater level of fulfillment. So the basic mitzva seems to be about having the sefer available to learn, while the connection that comes from writing it oneself is extra.

ציווי שנצטווינו שיהא לכל-זכר ממנו ספר תורה לעצמו. ואם יכתבו בידו - הרי זה משבח מאד והוא עדיף, כמו שאמרו: "כתבו מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו קיבלו מהר סיני". ואם אי אפשר לו לכתבו בידו - חייב הוא לקנותו או יבקש שיכתבו בשבילו...

In the Mishneh Torah(ספר תורה ז:א), however, the Rambam doesn't mention the possibility of purchasing a sefer torah, and in fact he describes the basic mitzva as writing it oneself. So here the main pupose of the mitzva seems to be to create a connection between the writer and Torah.

מצות עשה על כל איש ואיש מישראל, לכתוב ספר תורה לעצמו:  שנאמר "ועתה, כתבו לכם את השירה הזאת" (דברים לא,יט), כלומר כתבו את התורה שיש בה שירה זו--לפי שאין כותבין את התורה, פרשייות פרשייות.  ואף על פי שהניחו לו לאדם אבותיו ספר תורה, מצוה לכתוב משלו.  ואם כתבו בידו, הרי הוא כאילו קיבלו מסיניי; ואם אינו יודע לכתוב, אחרים כותבין לו.  וכל המגיה בספר תורה, אפילו אות אחת--הרי זה כאילו כתבו, כולו.

The Rosh

A second nafka mina is the chiddush of the Rosh on מנחות ל א(brought in the טור יורה דעה ער:ג), who says that now that we keep sifrei torah in the synagogue, the mitzva is now to write chumashim and gemaras etc. The Rosh is a rather extreme example of the view that the point of the writing is to facilitate learning, so much so that he even drops the requirement of it being a kosher Sefer Torah! Note, that most of Am Yisrael seems to follow the Rosh, since we buy books, but most people aren't machmir to write their own personal sefer torah.

Other Nafka Minot

A third nafka mina is whether a lost torah needs to be replaced. If the point is learning, then you need a new one. If the point is to create the connection, that perhaps still exists even when the physical scroll is no longer in your posession.

The final nafka mina that was mentioned was the question of whether you can fulfill the mitzva by donating a scroll to the synagogue. Assuming that the point is that you should own the scroll so you can learn it, some poskim say that when you donate the scroll you shouldn't renounce your legal ownership of the scroll.

Writing a Sefer Torah

OK, let's do this! The latest shiur I attended on Sanhedrin:

Two Mitzvot to Write

By the Rambam's count(סה"מ יז, יח) there are two mitzvot to write a torah scroll, one applying to every Jew, the other only to a king. The source of the King's obligation is explicit in the Torah(דברים יז:יח), while the source of the general obligation is סנהדרין כא ב.

וכותב ספר תורה לשמו: תנא ובלבד שלא יתנאה בשל אבותיו אמר (רבא) אף על פי שהניחו לו אבותיו לאדם ספר תורה מצוה לכתוב משלו שנאמר (דברים לא, יט) ועתה כתבו לכם את השירה איתיביה אביי וכותב לו ספר תורה לשמו שלא יתנאה בשל אחרים מלך אין הדיוט לא לא צריכא לשתי תורות וכדתניא (דברים יז, יח) וכתב לו את משנה וגו' כותב לשמו שתי תורות אחת שהיא יוצאה ונכנסת עמו ואחת שמונחת לו בבית גנזיו אותה שיוצאה ונכנסת עמו (עושה אותה כמין קמיע ותולה בזרועו שנאמר (תהלים טז, ח) שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד כי מימיני בל אמוט) אינו נכנס בה לא לבית המרחץ ולא לבית הכסא שנאמר (דברים יז, יט) והיתה עמו וקרא בו מקום הראוי לקראות בו

So Rava introduces the general obligation to write a torah from "ועתה כתבו לכם את השירה...". Abaye disagrees, but Rav M pointed out that it's not clear what assumption he disagrees with:

• Perhaps he disagrees that the general obligation has a requirement of לשמו, reserving that requirement only for the king
• in which case the baraita about the king's two scrolls refers to one for his general obligation and another for his kingly obligation
• Or perhaps he disagrees that there even is a general obligation to write a Torah scroll
• in which case the baraita apparently is saying that the king requires two scrolls as king, one that he carries around and the other that he keeps in his home

שפטים ושטרים תתן לך בכל שעריך

Well, I haven't been to Sanhedrin shiur recently due to career-related sinks on my time, so instead I began reading this great series of shiurim on Sanhedrin by Rav Ohad Fiksler. So, hopefully this will be the first in a series of posts as I read through those.

So let's back it up and talk about the mitzva to create a Torah judicial system throughout the land.

שֹׁפְטִים וְשֹׁטְרִים תִּתֶּן לְךָ בְּכָל שְׁעָרֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר ה' אֱלֹקֶיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ לִשְׁבָטֶיךָ וְשָׁפְטוּ אֶת הָעָם מִשְׁפַּט צֶדֶק" (דברים ט"ז,יח).

Does it Apply in Chutz La'Aretz?

The question is whether this mitzva applies only within Eretz Yisrael or also in communities in Chutz La'Aretz. And, in fact, there are two opinions...

According to the Ramban's understanding(על דברים ט"ז,יח) of the Rambam, the mitzva to appoint judges only applies within Eretz Yisrael. The Ramban himself feels that it also applies in chutz la'aretz, but not necessarily in every single city

 אתה מושיב בכל פלך ופלך ואי אתה מושיב בכל עיר ועיר

And note that Rav Fiksler makes a compelling argument that the Rambam may have actually held of the Ramaban's opinion himself.

But, in any case, we have too opinions and according to both there is a difference between our obligation to set-up halachic legal systems in Eretz Yisrael and Chutz La'Aretz. The the question, however, WHY? Why is the difference between different the different lands and why the difference between the two opinions?

Mitzvot in Eretz Yisrael

A more basic question is whether the difference in our obligation to create a Judicial system in Eretz Yisrael vs. Chutz La'Aretz is quantitative or qualitative. Is our obligation less in Chutz La'Aretz simply due to the assumption that fewer Jews reside there or is there some more essential difference between the two lands?

I'm reminded of the oft-quoted Ramban(ויקרא יח כה) on Eretz Yisrael's special status as Hashem's Domain and the resultant special status that Mitzva observance has there. According to this, we can certainly understand the Rambam's opinion(as understood by Ramban) that the mitzva only applies in Eretz Yisrael. Because of the increased importance of mitzva observance within the Land, there is a separate mitzva to create legal institutions to help enforce said observance.

Of course, the other opinion, that the mitzva of Shoftim Veshotrim also applies in Chutz La'Aretz, doesn't contradict this principal. Rather, a mitzva can exist for multiple reasons and so the mitzva in chutz La'Aretz exists generally to promote mitzva observance and to help settle disputes in a civil manner. It nevertheless has a lesser importance and therefore the obligation allows for a more sparse distribution of Batei Din in Chutz La'Aretz

Understanding Self-Incriminating Testimony

So, I attended another class, delving deeper into the concept of אין אדם משים עצמו רשע:


The Rambam(like Rashi) explains the principle of אין אדם משים עצמו רשע as a more general principal than our specific case(סנהדרין ט ב) where the witness cannot invalidate himself. He expands it to capital crimes, saying that the court cannot capitally punish someone based on their own admission. The reason he gives is that we suspect he may be attempting suicide by court.

הגונב כלי שרת מן המקדש והמקלל בקוסם והבועל ארמית אין בית דין נזקקין להן אלא הקנאין פוגעין בהן וכל שהורגן זכה וכן כהן ששמש בטומאה לא היו אחיו הכהנים מביאין אותו לבית דין אלא פרחי כהונה היו מוציאין אותו חוץ לעזרה ופוצעין את מוחו בגזירין גזירת הכתוב היא שאין ממיתין בית דין ולא מלקין את האדם בהודאת פיו אלא על פי שנים עדים וזה שהרג יהושע עכן ודוד לגר עמלקי בהודאת פיהם הוראת שעה היתה או דין מלכות היה אבל הסנהדרין אין ממיתין ולא מלקין המודה בעבירה שמא נטרפה דעתו בדבר זה שמא מן העמלין מרי נפש הוא המחכים למות שתוקעין החרבות בבטנם ומשליכין עצמן מעל הגגות שמא כך זה יבא ויאמר דבר שלא עשה כדי שיהרג וכללו של דבר גזירת מלך היא.

The Radbaz on the Rambam, gives a slightly different explanation, giving the reason that out that one's life is not his own possession, rather it is God's. Nevertheless, the Radbaz's intention isn't so clear-- why shouldn't a person be allowed to confess to the court when they indeed are guilty and deserve the appropriate sentence?

ראייה או סמיכה

Rav M. suggested that the answer lies in the nature of self-testimony. When the court acts based on normal testimony, they are acting based on what is effectively solid, reliable evidence. When they act based on a confession, on the other hand, there is no evidence. Rather, they are relying on a less reliable account, since, anyway the witness' testimony is to his own detriment.

So, in monetary cases, the court acts based on his confession since, anyway it's his own money to lose. But in a capital case, the court cannot act based on his confession, since his life is not his own to give away.

Rav Asher Weiss(מנחת אשר פרשת משפטים מ, ה) expresses this view quite clearly:

ונראה לבאר האי דינא בדרך אחר, והוא דהודאת בעל דין אינו התחייבות או נאמנות אלא 'הנחה' דיש לן להניח כדברי בעל הדין המודה בחובתו ופטורין אנו מלעשוק בדיני ראיות...

So, ultimatley there is a fundamental debate between the Rambam and the Radbaz. The Rambam says that self-incrimination is not admissible because testimony must be objective and we are worried that one confessing may have some ulterior motive. The Radbaz says that confession is it's own weaker category of evidence, not based on proof, which can only be relied upon in specific types of cases.

Confession in Monetary Cases

As an added bonus, the Radbaz's explanation of why the court can accept confession in monetary cases is more satisfactory than that of the Mahari Ben Lev(שו"ת מהר"י בן לב חלק א סימן יט). He explains that when the court listens to self-incriminating testimony in monetary cases, it's isn't even considered a court ruling, rather that the witness is giving the other party a present:

אלא דיראה לי לפי זה הדרך דמה דהוא חייב הוי מטעם מתנה...

Understanding Rashi's Take

Our recent post about אין אדם משים עצמו רשע left a question open: how does Rashi's understanding jive with the principal of עדות שבטלה מקצתה בטלה קולה? Our principal allows us to only invalidate part of the testimony, while that principal says that once part of the testimony is invalidated, all of it is invalidated.

Take 1: Legal Loophole

This article, by Rav Ofer Fried, presents it as a legal loophole that the judges can use to get around the problem of the testimony being invalidated by a blood relation. The assumption is that the division of the witness' testimony into different pieces is subjective and the judges can do this at their own discretion:

מ"מ, לכל הראשונים הללו, ה'פלגינן' הוא פעולה שעושה בית הדין כדי לפטור את הבעיה של 'עדות שבטלה מקצתה בטלה כולה'.

This answer is a bit unsatisfying, though. In general we would prefer to understand the concept as some general fundamental rule, rather than a subjective technicality to be applied at the Judge's whim.

In Pursuit of a More Fundamental Answer

I asked Rav M about this and he gave me a couple of more fundamental answers in brief. After learning up the source for עדות שבטלה מקצתה בטלה קולה, this is how I understand his answers.  Let's start out by looking at the relevant gemara(בבא קמא עג א)

תנן גנב על פי שנים וטבח ומכר על פיהם ונמצאו זוממין משלמין את הכל מאי לאו שהעידו על הגניבה וחזרו והעידו על הטביחה והוזמו על הגניבה וחזרו והוזמו על הטביחה ואי סלקא דעתך למפרע הוא נפסל הני כיון דאיתזמו להו אגניבה איגלאי מילתא למפרע דכי אסהדו אטביחה פסולין הוו אמאי משלמין אטביחה אמרי הכא במאי עסקינן כגון שהוזמו על הטביחה תחילה אמרי סוף סוף כי הדרי מיתזמי אגניבה איגלאי מילתא דכי אסהדו אטביחה פסולין הוו אמאי משלמי אטביחה והלכתא שהעידו בבת אחת והוזמו 

לימא כתנאי היו שנים מעידין אותו שגנב והן מעידין אותו שטבח והוזמו על הגניבה עדות שבטלה מקצתה בטלה כולה הוזמו על הטביחה הוא משלם תשלומי כפל והן משלמין תשלומי שלשה א"ר יוסי בד"א בשתי עדיות אבל בעדות אחת עדות שבטלה מקצתה בטלה כולה מאי בשתי עדיות ומאי בעדות אחת אילימא בשתי עדיות בשתי עדיות ממש בשתי כתות בעדות אחת בכת אחת בזה אחר זה וא"ר יוסי בעדות אחת בכת אחת בזה אחר זה כי מסהדי אגניבה והדר מסהדי אטביחה כי מתזמי אטביחה עדות שבטלה מקצתה בטלה כולה ואיתזמו להו אגניבה מהיכא תיתי הך אלא לאו בשתי עדיות בעדות אחת כעין שתי עדיות ומאי נינהו כת אחת בזה אחר זה אבל בעדות אחת בבת אחת לא וסברוה דכולי עלמא תוך כדי דיבור כדיבור דמי...

The gemara brings a number of sources about עדות שבטלה מקצתה בטלה קולה and contemplates the interpretation of the various opinions. In any case, it seems that the principle would apply according to all the opinions in a case like ours in סנהדרין ט ב where the two testimonies come as part of the same sentence. So how do we reconcile this source with our own?

Take 2: Limiting the Principle to Plotting Witnesses

While our sugya discusses a witness disqualified as a blood relative(according to Rashi), the sugya in Bava Kama is dealing with a case where the witnesses were found to be עדים זוממים. Perhaps עדות שבטלה מקצתה בטלה קולה only applies to the latter group, where the witnesses have been shown to be dishonest people, but in the case of disqualification of a blood relative we say מפלגינן בדיבורא and allow the second testimony to stand.

 

Take 3: Two Testimonies for Two Defendants

In the case in Bava Kava, the two testimonies both relate to the same theft by the same thief, the question being as to the severity of the theft. In Sanhedrin, on the other hand, the two testimonies are about two different people, engaged in the same act: the accused and the witness himself. Maybe in the latter case, where two different people are concerned, Rava views the testimony as two separate testimonies, while in the former he views it as one.

A Wider Range

 So while we concluded last time that both understandings of אין אדם משים עצמו רשע are pretty similar, we have a wider range of views of the principle of עדות שבטלה מקצתה בטלה קולה. On one hand we have the Raavad's view of Rav, that it's a כלל גדול, a general principal in the disqualification of testimony. On the other side of the spectrum, it may be limited to עדים זוממים or only applicable when the two testimonies are about different aspects of the same act by the same defendant.

אין אדם משים עצמו רשע

This one is actually from a class that I missed, but got the source sheet for. I also heard a brief oral synopsis of the class.

Debate Over Partially Disqualifying Testimony

The gemara(סנהדרין ט ב) introduces a debate about testimony. Rav Yosef says that if a witness' testimony also implicates the witness himself in a transgression, then his testimony is invalidated. Rava, on the other hand, argues that, while the witness' testimony cannot be used to convict the witness himself, it is still used to convict his fellow:

ואמר רב יוסף פלוני רבעו לאונסו הוא ואחר מצטרפין להרגו לרצונו רשע הוא והתורה אמרה אל תשת רשע עד רבא אמר אדם קרוב אצל עצמו ואין אדם משים עצמו רשע

The gemara continues with a related teaching of Rava and gives a name to his side of the debate: מפלגינן דיבורא

אמר רבא פלוני בא על אשתי הוא ואחר מצטרפין להורגו אבל לא להורגה מאי קא משמע לן דמפלגינן בדיבורא

Testimony of a Relative or Not Testimony at All

Now let's go back and look at the principle that one cannot incriminate oneself with one's testimony: אדם קרוב אצל עצמו ואין אדם משים עצמו רשע

Rashi sees this halacha as an extension of the general principle that testimony from a blood relative is invalid:

רבא אמר...כלומר על עדות עצמו אינו נעשה רשע שהרי תורה פסלה קרוב לעדות

The Ran (דף י א, ד"ה מהו דתימא), disagrees with this assessment, bringing in the principle of עדות שבטלה מקצתה נתבטלה קולה, that once part of the testimony has been invalidated, all of it is invalidated. Instead, he brings the Raavad's explanation of Rava, which says that the reason the court cannot accept testimony about the witness himself is that it isn't considered testimony at all. As such מפלגינן בדיבורא, into two parts: the inadmissible admission about himself, and the actual testimony about the other which remains valid.

כמו שפי' הרעב"ד... אבל כשהוא מעיד על עצמו, לא שייך ביה תורת עדות כלל, ומ"ה אמרינן אדם קרוב אצל עצמו ופלגינן דיבורה. ולגבי עצמו לא מהימן ולגבי אחר מהימן

In any case, according to both Rashi and the Raavad, testimony is an objective observer's view of the situation. As such one's account about one's own actions are not admissible, either because it is like a relative's testimony, or because it's not considered testimony at all.

Whether or Not to Encourage a Settlement

The gemara (סנהדרין ו ב) gives four opinions on whether and, if so, when a court should suggest litigants do פשרה/ביצוע:

1. ר"א בנו של רבי יוסי הגלילי אומר אסור לבצוע
2. רבי יהושע בן קרחה אומר מצוה לבצוע
3. רבי שמעון בן מנסיא אומר...עד שלא תשמע דבריהן או משתשמע דבריהן ואי אתה יודע להיכן דין נוטה אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו משתשמע דבריהן ואתה יודע להיכן הדין נוטה אי אתה רשאי לומר להן צאו ובצעו
4. וריש לקיש אמר שנים שבאו לדין אחד רך ואחד קשה עד שלא תשמע דבריהן או משתשמע דבריהן ואי אתה יודע להיכן דין נוטה אתה רשאי לומר להם אין אני נזקק לכם שמא נתחייב חזק ונמצא חזק רודפו...

The Role of the Court

Rav M's class started out looking at the first two opinions, either that Pshara is prohibited, or that it's a mitzva. He attributed the debate to a fundamental dispute over the role of the court:

Mitzva Reason 1: שלום

Rebbe Yehoshua ben Korcha implies his own reason why settlement is a mitzva via two drashot. The gist of both is that, when two sides go to court, they remain enemies even after the ruling. If, however, they manage to come to a compromise, they will leave friends, each having demonstrated that they are willing to compromise for the sake of the other.

Here, the Torah trusts the court with the role not only of passing judgement, but of keeping the peace and preserving society. The judges must look at the big picture and prefer an outcome which, although it conforms less to the value of justice, better upholds the value of keeping the peace.

Prohibition Reason 1: the Role of the Court

Rebbe Elazar son of Rebbe Yosei Haglili also values compromise, as we see from the example he brings of Aharon Hakohen. So why does he forbid the judges from pushing the litigants to settle? Because he thinks the court's role is solely to pass correct judgement, and to uphold society in that manner. Private individuals can encourage the sides to compromise, but once it reaches the judges, they must do their job with no compromises, however well-meaning.

Alternative Reasons to Prefer Settlement

Ultimately, today's halachik courts do prefer פשרה. One of the reasons for this is the limited authority of halachik courts today: they can't judge דיני קנסות because there is no longer smicha and they also don't have authority to use coercive force. The Rav also brought a few more general reasons to prefer pshara:

Mitzva Reason 2: משפט צדק

Contrary to our initial assumption, sometimes settlement yields a more just result than a formal trial. For instance, consider the case of a thief against whom there is not enough evidence(especially given the strict halachik criteria for admissible evidence). If we do פשרה, then at least he will have paid back some of what he owes.

Mitzva Reason 3: Sparing the Judges

Acting as a halachik judge is a great responsibility. The judge is Hashem's representative and is tasked with a near impossible task: to judge a case with imperfect knowledge. The possibility to err is great, so pshara saves the judge from this responsibility by allowing the litigants to reach their own compromise. Rav M quoted a paper by הרב אליהו ליפשיץ(I tried looking it up but couldn't find a reference) that makes this claim, but he challenged it based on our gemara:

רבי חנין אומר לא תכניס דבריך מפני איש ויהו עדים יודעים את מי הן מעידין ולפני מי הן מעידין ומי עתיד ליפרע מהן שנא' (דברים יט, יז) ועמדו שני האנשים אשר להם הריב לפני ה' ויהו הדיינין יודעין את מי הן דנין ולפני מי הן דנין ומי עתיד ליפרע מהן שנא' (תהלים פב, א) אלהים נצב בעדת אל וכן ביהושפט הוא אומר (דברי הימים ב יט, ו) ויאמר אל השופטים ראו מה אתם עושים כי לא לאדם תשפטו כי (אם) לה' שמא יאמר הדיין מה לי בצער הזה ת"ל עמכם בדבר משפט אין לו לדיין אלא מה שעיניו רואות

Rebbe Chanin emphasizes the weighty responsibility of the judge, but then asks why should the judge accept such a heavy responsibility? He answers with a drasha that the judge needs to judge based on what he sees, and not worry about what he doesn't. The gemara seems to be saying that the judge's liability is limited to doing his best with the evidence that is brought before him.

 

פשרה

Last Thursday's class started the topic of פשרה or settlement. Basically, the idea is that, rather than going through the formal process of both sides bringing claims and proofs and arguments in front of the judge and having him decide the case, the litigants come to a compromise on their own.

Strangely, פשרה isn't mentioned in the Mishna at all. Instead, it's main sources are:

• תוספתא סנהדרין א:ג
• גמרא סנהדרין ה: למטה עד ו: למעלה

 

A Type of Litigation or a Private Compromise

The main question the class dealt with was how to define פשרה. On one hand, it may be a way to avoid going through the trouble of the legal process by coming to a private compromise. On the other hand it may itself a type of litigation, albeit a less formal one, in which the litigants agree on a ruling. We saw several debates which seemed to center around this question:

1. Control Over the Process?

There are two stages to arriving at a פשרה:

1. The compromise itself
2. The Process i.e. who will judge the case?

Tosafot(ה: ד"ה יפה כח) indicate that the litigants can even choose the judges who will enforce their agreement. This seems to indicate that פשרה is a private agreement, since the process itself is open to negotiation.

The Ran(ה: ד"ה יפה), on the other hand, says that once the compromise itself has been agreed upon, any בית דין can enforce it. This indicates that פשרה is actually a type of litigation, since, as with most litigation, the litigants don't have control over the process.

2. Number of Judges

The gemara(ו א) records a debate as to the number of judges needed for פשרה. Rebbe Meir says 3, while Chachamim say 1:

לימא כתנאי ביצוע בשלשה דברי ר"מ וחכ"א פשרה ביחיד סברוה לכ"ע מקשינן פשרה לדין מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר דין בשלשה ומר סבר דין בשנים לא דכ"ע דין בשלשה והכא בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר מקשינן פשרה לדין ומר סבר לא מקשינן פשרה לדין לימא תלתא תנאי בפשרה דמר סבר בשלשה ומר סבר בשנים ומר סבר ביחיד אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא ואיתימא רבי יימר בר שלמיא מאן דאמר תרי אפילו חד נמי והאי דקאמר תרי כי היכי דליהוו עליה סהדי אמר רב אשי ש"מ פשרה אינה צריכה קנין דאי סלקא דעתך צריכה קנין למ"ד צריכה תלתא ל"ל תסגי בתרי וליקני מיניה והלכתא פשרה צריכה קנין

 

Rav M. pointed out that there are two ways to understand this debate. We might read it as a fundamental debate over our issue of how to understand פשרה. If פשרה is a type of litigation, then it is similar to דין and requires 3 judges, just like a normal case. If, however, it is a private agreement, then even a single judge is sufficient.

However, one might also claim that the number of judges isn't subject to our fundamental question about the nature of פשרה. One could understand that both sides of the debate hold that פשרה is a type of litigation, but that חכמים say that since it is a less strict type of litigation so it only requires a single judge.

Rav M. said that while none of the Rishonim say either of these options explicitly, Tosafot Rosh(ד"ה בצוע בשלושה) sounds like he might consider it a fundamental machloket,

ומאן דמחמיר קרי ליה ביצוע שצריך ג' כעין דין שצריך לדקדק ולצמצם ולבצע כפי הראוי מזה וליתן לזה לפי הענין ומאן דמקיל קרי ליה פשרה דאין צריך לדקדק כל כך...

 While the Ran(ד"ה איתיהיה) sounds like he doesn't believe there is a fundamental machloket here:

לפי שדרכו של דין זה מהפך בזכותו של זה וזה מהפך בזכותי של זה מפני שאינן לשלום אלא כעין מלחמה, אבל פשרה שהיא שלום ושניהם מתכוונים בו האחד בשניים...

3. How carefully do we do פשרה?

Another possible difference borrowed from the Tosafot Rosh above is how carefully we do פשרה. The Tosafot Rosh says that according to Rebbe Meir פשרה requires the judges to be just as careful about weighing each side's case as in an official trial. This makes more sense if we assume that פשרה is actually a type of litigation. On the other hand, if it's a private compromise then there's no need for so much formal process and it's more important to get the sides to agree to some compromise.

4. Is a Kinyan Required?

The gemara above brings Rav Ashi's conclusion that if Pshara requires 3 judges, there is no need for a kinyan. The implication is that according to Chachamim who require only 1 judge, we do need a kinyan to make the settlement official. The Ohr Zaruah reads the gemara like this and the implication again seems to be that if פשרה is a private agreement then it requires a kinyan like any private contract, while if it is a type of litigation so the judges authority is what makes it official.

It's worth noting that Rashi reads the gemara's conclusion differently:

והלכתא פשרה צריכה קנין: ואפילו נעשית בשלשה

Surprisingly, Rashi reads the Gemara's conclusion as saying that according to both opinions a kinyan is required. Tosfos(ד"ה והלכתא) explains, however, that this is for an external reason, so that the litigants won't be able to overturn the פשרה by claiming the judges weren't knowledgeable enough.

Permission to Judge, Permission to Teach

So we discussed two types of permission a sage requires to do his job in Rav M's class today. The first is permission to act as a Judge in monetary cases, while the second is permission to teach practical Halacha.

Torah Judgement vs. Kingly Judgement

The King as Judge

What's the issue? This is how I understood it, keeping in mind that I missed a few classes: Today we don't have smicha going back to Moshe Rabeinu, so how can a sage act as a judge in a monetary case? There is another track to acting as Judge: the track of a King. A king from the tribe of Judah has the divine right to rule over Israel and this is independent of smicha. So the King's right to judge is not based on his Torah knowledge as with smicha, it's based on his right to rulership.

Permission to Judge

Now, in the time of the Gemara there was no king, but there were the נשיא and the ריש גלותא and their right to rule the community in exile is based on that of the King. So, their ability to pass judgement in monetary cases is based not on their being a representative of Torah law per say, but on the principle of הפקר בית דין הפקר, basically that the King has the right to decide to take away your property when appropriate. That's where the issue of permission comes in. If only the נשיא and the ריש גלותא have the right to judge monetary cases, then any sage who wants to judge a monetary case must do so with their permission, basically as their representative.

So today's discussion revolved around the following gemara on Sanhedrin 5A:

והא רבה בר רב הונא כי הוה מינצי בהדי דבי ריש גלותא אמר לאו מינייכו נקיטנא רשותא נקיטנא רשותא מאבא מרי ואבא מרי מרב ורב מר' חייא ור' חייא מרבי

The problem is that Raba Bar Rav Huna lived after Rebbe, so how can his permission still hold power after his lifetime? Tosfos(ד"ה נקיטנא) says it works like smicha i.e. it can be passed on to future generations, but it's not so clear why that should be. The Rivash(סימן רעא) says that it's a girsa mistake and really it's an earlier amora, Raba Bar Bar Chana, which makes more sense, although the Ohr Samachach disputes this on textual grounds i.e. that Tosfos' girsa is correct, however hard it is to understand.

Permission to Teach

סמיכת יהושע בן נון

The second part of the class dealt with permission to teach halacha, discussed on Sanhedrin 5B. There are a couple factors at play here. First off, the gemara says that Chazal realized that, with the absence of smicha, there needed to be a minimum standard for teaching halacha, otherwise mistakes would occur.

באותה שעה גזרו תלמיד אל יורה אלא אם כן נוטל רשות מרבו

Additionally the gemara brings a baraita saying that a student shouldn't teach in the proximity of his master.

ותניא תלמיד אל יורה הלכה במקום רבו אלא אם כן היה רחוק ממנו שלש פרסאות כנגד מחנה ישראל

And finally, the rishonim point out another gemara(עירובין סג א) that seems to indicate that a student shouldn't teach in the lifetime of his master regardless of the distance.

אמר רבא בפניו אסור וחייב מיתה שלא בפניו אסור ואין חייב מיתה

So how do we resolve this contradiction?

Tosafot(ד"ה אלא) say that our gemara is talking about where the teacher gave permission to teach and the gemara in Eruvin is where the teacher didn't give permission to teach. But the question then arises, why can't the Rebbe be מוחל על כבודו as with other mitzvas of  כבוד הרב?

כבוד הרב לאומת כבוד המסורת עצמה

The answer seems to be to distinguish between the personal honor of the Rebbe vs. the Honor of the Tradition. Teaching in close proximity to one's teacher doesn't just damage his honor, the lack of deference is viewed as an assault on the mesoret itself and therefore the Rebbe cannot be מוחל.

The Ran brings the opinion of Rabeinu David, who says like Tosafot, but the Ran doesn't understand why the Rebbe can't be מוחל.

The Rambam takes a different approach, essentially saying that our gemara is talking about answering an occasional halachik question vs. opening one's own competing beit midrash. The former is allowed when far from the Rav or in close proximity with the Rav's permission. The latter is never allowed, again, presumably because it's an issue of the honor of the mesoret itself, not just the personal honor of the Master.

Ruling by Majority

The gemara (סנהדרין ג ב) decides after some discussion that all rulings follow the majority opinion among the judges.

מאי טעמא דרבי יהודה (ויקרא ד, טו) וסמכו שנים זקני שנים ואין בית דין שקול מוסיפין עליהן עוד אחד הרי כאן ה' דרבי יאשיה עדיפא מדר' יהודה דאילו ר' יהודה בסנהדרי גדולה הוא דלית ליה הא בשאר בי דינא אית ליה ור' יאשיה בשאר בי דינא נמי לית ליה ואלא האי לנטות מאי עביד ליה מוקים לה בדיני נפשות אבל בדיני ממונות לא אלא הא דתנן שנים אומרים זכאי ואחד אומר חייב זכאי שנים אומרים חייב ואחד אומר זכאי חייב נימא דלא כרבי יאשיה אפילו תימא רבי יאשיה מייתי לה בקל וחומר מדיני נפשות ומה דיני נפשות דחמירי אמר רחמנא זיל בתר רובא דיני ממונות לא כל שכן:

So let's say we have a case and the judges don't come to a unanimous decision. How do we relate to the Majority and the Minority opinions. Rav M. suggested two possibilities:

1. Indication of Correctness- the fact that most of the Judges hold this opinion indicates that is correct and the other is incorrect
2. Political Necessity- we're not sure which group of Judges is correct, but a decision needs to be made so we follow the majority

 

Judicial Ruling vs. Halachik Ruling

We see that, unlike Judicial Rulings, Halachik Rulings are not always ruled in favor of the majority opinion. For example, the gemara(יבמות יד א) which says that Beit Shamai's sharp intellects nullify the principal of majority:

למ"ד לא עשו דהא ב"ה רובא ומ"ד עשו כי אזלינן בתר רובא היכא דכי הדדי נינהו הכא בית שמאי מחדדי טפי

To explain this gemara, the Ramban(סנהדרין לב א) differentiates between Judicial Rulings and Halachik Rulings:

ויש לומר התם לא יושבין בדין הם והשואל עושה כרצון עצמו לפי שלבו נוטה אחר חכמה, אבל סנהדרין כולן צריכין לדון וראוי היה שיסכימו כולן לאותו דעת אלא דרחמנא אמר אחרי רבים להטות

The Ramban's opinion seems to be based on the distinction above. Halachik Rulings are solely about finding the truth, so a person can follow the majority, or the wisest sage--whatever seems correct to them in this particular case. Judicial Rulings, on the other hand, also have a strong communal/political aspect, so following the majority is the only appropriate method of decision-making.

Categories of Monetary Cases in Halacha and Common Law

So, in a recent post we discussed the similarity between the distinction between גזילות וחבלות and הודעות והלוות in Halacha and the distinction between Criminal Law and Civil Law in common law. Now let's discuss how they are different.

Criminal vs. Civil

One important difference is the Plaintiff i.e. the party making the claim in court. In Civil Law, the Plaintiff is a private party--an individual, a group, a company. This private party claims that they have been wronged by the Defendant. In Criminal Law, however, the Plaintiff is the state, or it's representative.

So, why are criminal cases viewed as generally more serious than civil cases? The main reason seems to be that it's considered more serious to commit an offense against the State than against an Individual. This idea is easiest to understand in a Democracy, where the rules of the State represent, to some degree, the rules of Society at large. A Civil offense primarily wrongs one's fellow, while a Criminal offense wrongs Society itself.

On could suggest that Friedrich Hayek would disagree with this distinction. In his book Law, Legislation, and Liberty vol. 1 Rules and Order(1973), Hayek distinguishes between Legislation and Law. Legislation is a rule the government made, while Law is a sort of Natural Law that emerges spontaneously in a Society. There's a good deal of overlap between these two categories, but both include rules not contained by the other.  As such, one could imagine a piece of Criminal Legislation which doesn't fall under the category of (Natural) Law, and in that case one might argue that one isn't really wronging Society. For instance, in Eureka, Nevada it is illegal for men who have mustaches to kiss women. Now I doubt that this piece of Legislation is still enforced, but were someone to be tried for it, one could certainly argue that when this rule ceased to be a (Natural) Law, one who transgresses it is not viewed as wronging Society.

I would reject this difficulty from Hayek for two reasons:

1. There is pretty good correlation between Law and Legislation, so in-general we can view transgressing Legislation as wronging Society
2. Even in the cases where they don't correlate, as with the Mustache Law, one could make the argument that transgressions of Legislation against a Democratically Elected State undermine said state and therefore wrong Society

גזילות וחבלות vs. הודעות והלוות

So, who is the Plaintiff in these Halachik categories? In the case of both גזילות וחבלות and הודעות והלוות it is an individual claiming damages. So the above distinction, between harming an individual vs. harming society does not seem to apply here. So why are גזילות וחבלות considered more serious than הודעות והלוות? As we suggested previously, because גזילות וחבלות usually begin with violence and/or illicit intent, whereas הודעות והלוות are non-violent and are often cases of misunderstanding of the law by one or both sides.

The Judges for הודעות והלוות

Here's the summary of the first part of the third and final shiur on the first sugia of Sanhedrin.

The Two Sides of the Debate

So last time we mentioned the debate over what is the Torah requirement for the number of judges needed to hear a case of הודעות והלוות:

• Rebbe Abahu and Rava say the Torah requires 3 judges, all of them סמוכים
• Chazal reduced this requirement to 3 הדיותות שלא לנעול דלת בפני לווין
• Rav Acha says the Torah requires 1 judge for הודעות והלוות, and it's a machloket rishonim if he needs to be סמוך
• Chazal increased this number because of יושבי קרנות

The Difficult Baraita

 

The gemara(סנהדרין ד ב) brings a baraita which seems to contradict both of these opinions. Here we discover a new track, a מומחה לרבים, which doesn't require 3, even מדרבנן:

 תנו רבנן דיני ממונות בשלשה ואם היה מומחה לרבים דן אפילו יחידי

So how do we explain this according to the two opinions?

• According to Rebbe Abahu and Rava, Chazal reduced the requirement to 3 הדיותות OR 1 מומחה לרבים
• According to Rav Acha, Chazal didn't increase the requirement to 3 in the case of a מומחה לרבים because in that case there is no worry of יושבי קרנות

This works for Tosfot(ד"ה ואם) but Rashi(ד"ה דן) only quotes the רב אחא side of the machloket.  So why does Rashi think the baraita is incompatible with Rebbe Abahu/Rava?

Rav Markus suggested that it's because Rashi understands that Rebbi Abahu always requires a Beit Din, so it's inconceivable that Chazal would ever reduce the requirement to a single judge, according to him.

Beginning Mesechet Sanhedrin

Well, with Winter beginning, I started attending Rav M's excellent gemara shiur at Yeshiva Ruach Tzfonit once again, so I'll be posting a few notes on individual lectures. Right now we're starting מסכת סנהדרין and this past Thursday's shiur touched on a number of topics.

1. דיני ממונות vs. נזיקין

The first mishna in Sanhedrin begins listing the sorts of cases tried in front of a Beit Din of 3 judges:

 ...דיני ממונות בשלושה גזילות וחבולות בשלושה

The gemara(ב:) immediately asks why the two are mentioned as separate categories. We ultimately hear two answers, that of Rebbe Abahu and that of Rava(on ג.) But while they have a debate on how to read the text of the Mishna, they agree that there are two separate categories:

• Theft and Damages(גזילות וחבלות)
• Admissions and Loans(הודאות והלוות)

Why should these be seen as different categories? Rav Marcus explained:

• It's similar to the difference between Criminal and Civil offenses
• Criminal offenses usually involve violence or threat of violence, while  Civil offenses involve trickery or misunderstanding(though this model doesn't map precisely to the two halachic categories)
• Theft and Damages started with an illicit act, while Admissions and Loans start with a perfectly legal arrangement and only become a problem later on

2. Number of Judges

One difference between the two categories that the Sugya mentions is how many judges are required to hear a case, with גזילות וחבלות requiring 3 and הודאות והלוות requiring only 1.

• Rebbe Abahu/Rava say the torah requires 3 judges, but Chazal reduced this number in the case of   הודאות והלוות so as not to discourage people from giving loans
• Rav Acha says that the torah requires 1 judge but Chazal required 3 since there would be less chance of an incompetent court(יושבי קרנות)
• The Rosh takes this literally as a single judge
• The Yad Rama understands this as meaning one knowledgeable(גמיר) judge and two others

So basically, we have 3 understandings of what the torah requirement is to judge these basic casesThese requirements are for an official בית דין, but if the litigants agree they can choose whoever they want to adjudicate their disagreement.

3. The nature of סמיכה 

 

The gemara says that judges must not be הדיותות, and Rashi explains this means they must have סמיכה. Rav Marcus then skipped ahead to the story of Rebbi Yehuda ben Baba giving his life to defy the Roman decree against smicha. Why is it so important? Why does the Torah require it?

The Rav suggested that it is not just a question of being knowledgeable. One who has smicha has been chosen to represent Hashem's schina. He has been appointed to fill a spiritual/communal position.

 

4. שליחותיהו עבדינן או הפקר בית דין הפקר

According to Rebbe Abahu/Rava, Chazal reduced the number of judges required to hear הודעות והלוות. The question remains: How can they override the Torah requirement? By what mechanism do they do this? The rishonim propose two different options:

• The Ritva in Gittin says שליחותיהו עבדינן
• The Ran in Sanhedrin says הפקר בית דין הפקר

The Ritva's answer is based on the gemara in גיטין פח:, in the case of כפיית הגט. The Ritva understands that there is a category similar to, but less than smicha called שליחותיהו עבדינן. Basically, even though they didn't give us smicha, the סמוכים gave a הרשאה כללית, a general provision, allowing חחמים who don't have smicha to act as a proxy in their absence.

Why does the Ran reject this answer? My assumption is that the example there actually had living סמוכים to rely on, while in our case we assume that this special provision applies even though there are no smuchim.

The Ran, on the other hand, says that actually the 3 non-סמוחים are not aren't judging, by the Torah definition. Rather, a beit din has the power to take or reassign anyone's money, so they are using that power to enact their judgement.