Our Story is Written in Blood

The 10 plagues begin with blood and they end with blood. They begin with the plague of blood(Shemot 7), and they end with the blood of the Pascal lamb spread across the doorjambs(Shemot 12).
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יד וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל-מֹשֶׁה, כָּבֵד לֵב פַּרְעֹה; מֵאֵן, לְשַׁלַּח הָעָם.  טו לֵךְ אֶל-פַּרְעֹה בַּבֹּקֶר, הִנֵּה יֹצֵא הַמַּיְמָה, וְנִצַּבְתָּ לִקְרָאתוֹ, עַל-שְׂפַת הַיְאֹר; וְהַמַּטֶּה אֲשֶׁר-נֶהְפַּךְ לְנָחָשׁ, תִּקַּח בְּיָדֶךָ.  טז וְאָמַרְתָּ אֵלָיו, יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי הָעִבְרִים שְׁלָחַנִי אֵלֶיךָ לֵאמֹר, שַׁלַּח אֶת-עַמִּי, וְיַעַבְדֻנִי בַּמִּדְבָּר; וְהִנֵּה לֹא-שָׁמַעְתָּ, עַד-כֹּה.  יז כֹּה, אָמַר יְהוָה, בְּזֹאת תֵּדַע, כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה:  הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי מַכֶּה בַּמַּטֶּה אֲשֶׁר-בְּיָדִי, עַל-הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר בַּיְאֹר--וְנֶהֶפְכוּ לְדָם.  יח וְהַדָּגָה אֲשֶׁר-בַּיְאֹר תָּמוּת, וּבָאַשׁ הַיְאֹר; וְנִלְאוּ מִצְרַיִם, לִשְׁתּוֹת מַיִם מִן-הַיְאֹר.  {ס}  יט וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל-מֹשֶׁה, אֱמֹר אֶל-אַהֲרֹן קַח מַטְּךָ וּנְטֵה-יָדְךָ עַל-מֵימֵי מִצְרַיִם עַל-נַהֲרֹתָם עַל-יְאֹרֵיהֶם וְעַל-אַגְמֵיהֶם וְעַל כָּל-מִקְוֵה מֵימֵיהֶם--וְיִהְיוּ-דָם; וְהָיָה דָם בְּכָל-אֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם, וּבָעֵצִים וּבָאֲבָנִים.  כ וַיַּעֲשׂוּ-כֵן מֹשֶׁה וְאַהֲרֹן כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה, וַיָּרֶם בַּמַּטֶּה וַיַּךְ אֶת-הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר בַּיְאֹר, לְעֵינֵי פַרְעֹה, וּלְעֵינֵי עֲבָדָיו; וַיֵּהָפְכוּ כָּל-הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר-בַּיְאֹר, לְדָם.  כא וְהַדָּגָה אֲשֶׁר-בַּיְאֹר מֵתָה, וַיִּבְאַשׁ הַיְאֹר, וְלֹא-יָכְלוּ מִצְרַיִם, לִשְׁתּוֹת מַיִם מִן-הַיְאֹר; וַיְהִי הַדָּם, בְּכָל-אֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם.  כב וַיַּעֲשׂוּ-כֵן חַרְטֻמֵּי מִצְרַיִם, בְּלָטֵיהֶם; וַיֶּחֱזַק לֵב-פַּרְעֹה וְלֹא-שָׁמַע אֲלֵהֶם, כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר יְהוָה.  כג וַיִּפֶן פַּרְעֹה, וַיָּבֹא אֶל-בֵּיתוֹ; וְלֹא-שָׁת לִבּוֹ, גַּם-לָזֹאת.  כד וַיַּחְפְּרוּ כָל-מִצְרַיִם סְבִיבֹת הַיְאֹר, מַיִם לִשְׁתּוֹת:  כִּי לֹא יָכְלוּ לִשְׁתֹּת, מִמֵּימֵי הַיְאֹר.  כה וַיִּמָּלֵא, שִׁבְעַת יָמִים, אַחֲרֵי הַכּוֹת-יְהוָה, אֶת-הַיְאֹר.  {פ}

ז וְלָקְחוּ, מִן-הַדָּם, וְנָתְנוּ עַל-שְׁתֵּי הַמְּזוּזֹת, וְעַל-הַמַּשְׁקוֹף--עַל, הַבָּתִּים, אֲשֶׁר-יֹאכְלוּ אֹתוֹ, בָּהֶם.  ח וְאָכְלוּ אֶת-הַבָּשָׂר, בַּלַּיְלָה הַזֶּה:  צְלִי-אֵשׁ וּמַצּוֹת, עַל-מְרֹרִים יֹאכְלֻהוּ.  ט אַל-תֹּאכְלוּ מִמֶּנּוּ נָא, וּבָשֵׁל מְבֻשָּׁל בַּמָּיִם:  כִּי אִם-צְלִי-אֵשׁ, רֹאשׁוֹ עַל-כְּרָעָיו וְעַל-קִרְבּוֹ.  י וְלֹא-תוֹתִירוּ מִמֶּנּוּ, עַד-בֹּקֶר; וְהַנֹּתָר מִמֶּנּוּ עַד-בֹּקֶר, בָּאֵשׁ תִּשְׂרֹפוּ.  יא וְכָכָה, תֹּאכְלוּ אֹתוֹ--מָתְנֵיכֶם חֲגֻרִים, נַעֲלֵיכֶם בְּרַגְלֵיכֶם וּמַקֶּלְכֶם בְּיֶדְכֶם; וַאֲכַלְתֶּם אֹתוֹ בְּחִפָּזוֹן, פֶּסַח הוּא לַיהוָה.  יב וְעָבַרְתִּי בְאֶרֶץ-מִצְרַיִם, בַּלַּיְלָה הַזֶּה, וְהִכֵּיתִי כָל-בְּכוֹר בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם, מֵאָדָם וְעַד-בְּהֵמָה; וּבְכָל-אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרַיִם אֶעֱשֶׂה שְׁפָטִים, אֲנִי יְהוָה.  יג וְהָיָה הַדָּם לָכֶם לְאֹת, עַל הַבָּתִּים אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם שָׁם, וְרָאִיתִי אֶת-הַדָּם, וּפָסַחְתִּי עֲלֵכֶם; וְלֹא-יִהְיֶה בָכֶם נֶגֶף לְמַשְׁחִית, בְּהַכֹּתִי בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם.

The question that follows is "Why?" Why this framing of the 10 plagues in blood? What message lies in this pronounced use of parallelism?

The Plague of Blood

We recently discussed the Plague of Blood as symbolizing the blood of the Israelite children Pharaoh ordered thrown into the Nile. This comes within the broader context of events meant to elicit foreboding and even Horror on the part of Pharaoh and his servants. We have covered the plague of blood pretty well. What of the blood of the Pascal lamb, though?

Moshe at the Malon

Before we get there, lets first discuss the first reference to blood in Sefer Shemot. I'm referring, of course, to the incident at the inn when Moshe and his family are on their way to Egypt(Shemot 4).

 כד וַיְהִי בַדֶּרֶךְ, בַּמָּלוֹן; וַיִּפְגְּשֵׁהוּ יְהוָה, וַיְבַקֵּשׁ הֲמִיתוֹ. כה וַתִּקַּח צִפֹּרָה צֹר, וַתִּכְרֹת אֶת-עָרְלַת בְּנָהּ, וַתַּגַּע, לְרַגְלָיו; וַתֹּאמֶר, כִּי חֲתַן-דָּמִים אַתָּה לִי. כו וַיִּרֶף, מִמֶּנּוּ; אָז, אָמְרָה, חֲתַן דָּמִים, לַמּוּלֹת.

After circumcising her son and thus saving Moshe's life from God's Angel, Tzipora calls God "Groom of Blood to the Circumcised".

We already noted previously the parallel between this passage and Yaakov wrestling with the Angel, but now let us note the difference between the passages. Here Moshe fails to overcome his heavenly attacker. Instead, he is only saved by the blood of his son's circumcision, by continuing to pass on Abraham's covenant with God.

Circumcision and Pesach

So why talk about Moshe at the inn? The reason is that this passage is itself connected to the blood of the Pascal lamb in a few ways:

1. Both portray Jews being saved from God's angel by ritually spilled blood
2. Moshe's own arc parallels that of the plagues. Like many less fortunate infants, he is left in the waters of the Nile(blood), he emerges from them alive(frogs-locusts), he kills an Egyptian(locusts-killing of firstborn). As such, Moshe's experience at the inn is a fitting parallel for the pascal lamb.
3. As Rav Yoel Ben-Nun points out( איזה ילד לא נימול ומדוע, תורת עציון על ספר שמות), the mitzva of the Passover sacrifice is related to the mitzva of circumcision. There is a rule that that the uncircumcised may not partake of the Passover sacrifice(Shemot 12)

מח וְכִי-יָגוּר אִתְּךָ גֵּר, וְעָשָׂה פֶסַח לַיהוָה--הִמּוֹל לוֹ כָל-זָכָר וְאָז יִקְרַב לַעֲשֹׂתוֹ, וְהָיָה כְּאֶזְרַח הָאָרֶץ; וְכָל-עָרֵל, לֹא-יֹאכַל בּוֹ. 

What emerges from this association is the idea that, like Moses at the malon, Israel's firstborn are only saved from the 10th plague due to their continued participation in Abraham's covenant with God i.e. by partaking of the Pascal Lamb in Egypt, and presumably because they are themselves circumcised.

 

 Blood of Retribution, Blood of Redemption

Having now thoroughly dissected blood as it appears in the first plague and the last, let us return to our original question. What message lies within this gory framing of the 10 plagues.

One answer that comes to mind is a message of reward and punishment. Blood that is spilled in sin awakens God's awful punishment, as experienced by the Egyptians. Blood spilled in God's service awakens Gods glorious redemption, as experienced by the Children of Israel.

That's if we merely contrast the two bloods, but I would claim the text also invites us to draw a comparison. The children of Israel showed their allegiance to the God of Abraham through circumcision and the highly public sign of smearing the blood of the pascal lamb on their doorposts. In doing so, they are giving meaning to the otherwise senseless deaths of their infants, thrown into the Nile by order of the Pharaoh. In declaring publicly our commitment to God, the epitome of our oppression in Egypt becomes an essential part of the story of Israel's Redemption, the story of how God's holy nation was born.

On a final note, Yechezkel refers to these two bloods that bore us when he says(chapter 16)

ה לֹא חָסָה עָלַיִךְ עַיִן לַעֲשׂוֹת לָךְ אַחַת מֵאֵלֶּה לְחֻמְלָה עָלָיִךְ וַתֻּשְׁלְכִי אֶל פְּנֵי הַשָּׂדֶה בְּגֹעַל נַפְשֵׁךְ בְּיוֹם הֻלֶּדֶת אֹתָךְ. ו וָאֶעֱבֹר עָלַיִךְ וָאֶרְאֵךְ מִתְבּוֹסֶסֶת בְּדָמָיִךְ וָאֹמַר לָךְ בְּדָמַיִךְ חֲיִי וָאֹמַר לָךְ בְּדָמַיִךְ חֲיִי

Amphibious Horrors and Zombie Moses

We recently discussed the Plague of Blood as symbolizing the blood of the Israelite children Pharaoh ordered thrown into the Nile. Now let's move on to the next plague, the Plague of Frogs.

God's Hand in Events

The plague of frogs is also centered around the Nile. The frogs come out of the Nile and fill the land(Shemot 7)

  כח וְשָׁרַץ הַיְאֹר, צְפַרְדְּעִים, וְעָלוּ וּבָאוּ בְּבֵיתֶךָ, וּבַחֲדַר מִשְׁכָּבְךָ וְעַל-מִטָּתֶךָ; וּבְבֵית עֲבָדֶיךָ וּבְעַמֶּךָ, וּבְתַנּוּרֶיךָ וּבְמִשְׁאֲרוֹתֶיךָ.

This, the leading verb שרץ, recalls the verse in the first chapter of Shemot that describes Israel's rapid propagation despite Egypt's mistreatment of them.

ז וּבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, פָּרוּ וַיִּשְׁרְצוּ וַיִּרְבּוּ וַיַּעַצְמוּ--בִּמְאֹד מְאֹד; וַתִּמָּלֵא הָאָרֶץ, אֹתָם.

The basic message here for Pharaoh and the Egyptians is clear. Just as the frogs bursting forth from the bloody Nile is God's doing, so too Bnei Israel's resilience in the face of Pharaoh's decrees is his work. This is in answer to Pharaoh's statement in Chapter 5 that he doesn't know who God is:

ב וַיֹּאמֶר פַּרְעֹה--מִי יְהוָה אֲשֶׁר אֶשְׁמַע בְּקֹלוֹ, לְשַׁלַּח אֶת-יִשְׂרָאֵל:  לֹא יָדַעְתִּי אֶת-יְהוָה, וְגַם אֶת-יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא אֲשַׁלֵּחַ.

The two subsequent plagues, those of Lice and Wild animals, seem to be along the same lines, with Hashem sending swarms of other unwanted animals throughout Egypt.

Day of the Frogs

That's said, there's another level. When the plague of Frogs is withdrawn(Shemot 8), all of them die and the smell of death and decay fills the land.

י וַיִּצְבְּרוּ אֹתָם, חֳמָרִם חֳמָרִם; וַתִּבְאַשׁ, הָאָרֶץ

This is similar to the stink of dead water animals from the Plague of Blood in the previous chapter.

כא וְהַדָּגָה אֲשֶׁר-בַּיְאֹר מֵתָה, וַיִּבְאַשׁ הַיְאֹר, וְלֹא-יָכְלוּ מִצְרַיִם, לִשְׁתּוֹת מַיִם מִן-הַיְאֹר; וַיְהִי הַדָּם, בְּכָל-אֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם.

The picture that emerges reminds us of a classic Gothic Horror novel. A terrible past, thought long buried, remains alive, fermenting, waiting to reemerge in all it's Horror. Each plague carries with it reminders of Pharaoh's victims, as of yet unavenged, and a sense of foreboding that hangs over Egypt.

To quote Gothic Literature professor Jack W. Shear:

The Present is Haunted by the Past
When Hamlet's father tells him that "the time is out of joint," he essentially codified the most important convention of Gothic literature: something horrible happened in the past and the reverberations from that event continue to haunt the present. The idea of haunting is central to the first Gothic novel, Horace Walpole's The Castle of Otranto: the usurpation of the throne generations ago has resulted in both a tyrant acting as prince and the intrusion of specters from the past into the present. The fictions that followed Walpole's Gothic mode applied that convention as a tenet of faith. 

Zombie Moses

It's also worth noting that Moshe's own personal arc reflects these two plagues. Isn't it strange that Moshe's loving sister puts him in a basket in the very river Pharaoh's decree would have him thrown into? She is fulfilling the decree in a literal sense, if not in spirit.

Then Pharaoh's own daughter saves the baby, pulling him alive from the waters of the Nile, waters that have seen the deaths of so many similar infants. And what does she call him? She names him after this very fact that he was tossed in the river but then saved from death's clutches.

י וַיִּגְדַּל הַיֶּלֶד, וַתְּבִאֵהוּ לְבַת-פַּרְעֹה, וַיְהִי-לָהּ, לְבֵן; וַתִּקְרָא שְׁמוֹ, מֹשֶׁה, וַתֹּאמֶר, כִּי מִן-הַמַּיִם מְשִׁיתִהוּ.

How ominous must it be for Pharaoh that these plagues, hinting doom for him because of his Evil decrees, are brought on by one named "From Out of the Waters I Drew Him". Moshe is the original Revenant, left for dead by Pharaoh's decree, yet coming back to deliver a message of unavoidable retribution.

Three Signs for Two Peoples

Let's take a look at the signs Moshe is instructed to give Israel as proof of his divine mandate(שמות ד):

א וַיַּעַן מֹשֶׁה, וַיֹּאמֶר, וְהֵן לֹא-יַאֲמִינוּ לִי, וְלֹא יִשְׁמְעוּ בְּקֹלִי:  כִּי יֹאמְרוּ, לֹא-נִרְאָה אֵלֶיךָ יְהוָה.  ב וַיֹּאמֶר אֵלָיו יְהוָה, מזה (מַה-זֶּה) בְיָדֶךָ; וַיֹּאמֶר, מַטֶּה.  ג וַיֹּאמֶר הַשְׁלִיכֵהוּ אַרְצָה, וַיַּשְׁלִכֵהוּ אַרְצָה וַיְהִי לְנָחָשׁ; וַיָּנָס מֹשֶׁה, מִפָּנָיו.  ד וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה, אֶל-מֹשֶׁה, שְׁלַח יָדְךָ, וֶאֱחֹז בִּזְנָבוֹ; וַיִּשְׁלַח יָדוֹ וַיַּחֲזֶק בּוֹ, וַיְהִי לְמַטֶּה בְּכַפּוֹ.  ה לְמַעַן יַאֲמִינוּ, כִּי-נִרְאָה אֵלֶיךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי אֲבֹתָם:  אֱלֹהֵי אַבְרָהָם אֱלֹהֵי יִצְחָק, וֵאלֹהֵי יַעֲקֹב.  ו וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה לוֹ עוֹד, הָבֵא-נָא יָדְךָ בְּחֵיקֶךָ, וַיָּבֵא יָדוֹ, בְּחֵיקוֹ; וַיּוֹצִאָהּ, וְהִנֵּה יָדוֹ מְצֹרַעַת כַּשָּׁלֶג.  ז וַיֹּאמֶר, הָשֵׁב יָדְךָ אֶל-חֵיקֶךָ, וַיָּשֶׁב יָדוֹ, אֶל-חֵיקוֹ; וַיּוֹצִאָהּ, מֵחֵיקוֹ, וְהִנֵּה-שָׁבָה, כִּבְשָׂרוֹ.  ח וְהָיָה, אִם-לֹא יַאֲמִינוּ לָךְ, וְלֹא יִשְׁמְעוּ, לְקֹל הָאֹת הָרִאשׁוֹן--וְהֶאֱמִינוּ, לְקֹל הָאֹת הָאַחֲרוֹן.  ט וְהָיָה אִם-לֹא יַאֲמִינוּ גַּם לִשְׁנֵי הָאֹתוֹת הָאֵלֶּה, וְלֹא יִשְׁמְעוּן לְקֹלֶךָ--וְלָקַחְתָּ מִמֵּימֵי הַיְאֹר, וְשָׁפַכְתָּ הַיַּבָּשָׁה; וְהָיוּ הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר תִּקַּח מִן-הַיְאֹר, וְהָיוּ לְדָם בַּיַּבָּשֶׁת.

The three signs given are:

1. Staff turned to snake and back again
2. The leprous hand and it's healing
3. Pouring Nile water to blood

Now let us consider Moshe's second meeting with Pharaoh, before which he is commanded to give a sign to the King of Egypt(שמות ז):

ח וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה, אֶל-מֹשֶׁה וְאֶל-אַהֲרֹן לֵאמֹר.  ט כִּי יְדַבֵּר אֲלֵכֶם פַּרְעֹה לֵאמֹר, תְּנוּ לָכֶם מוֹפֵת; וְאָמַרְתָּ אֶל-אַהֲרֹן, קַח אֶת-מַטְּךָ וְהַשְׁלֵךְ לִפְנֵי-פַרְעֹה--יְהִי לְתַנִּין.  י וַיָּבֹא מֹשֶׁה וְאַהֲרֹן, אֶל-פַּרְעֹה, וַיַּעֲשׂוּ כֵן, כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה; וַיַּשְׁלֵךְ אַהֲרֹן אֶת-מַטֵּהוּ, לִפְנֵי פַרְעֹה וְלִפְנֵי עֲבָדָיו--וַיְהִי לְתַנִּין.  יא וַיִּקְרָא, גַּם-פַּרְעֹה, לַחֲכָמִים, וְלַמְכַשְּׁפִים; וַיַּעֲשׂוּ גַם-הֵם חַרְטֻמֵּי מִצְרַיִם, בְּלַהֲטֵיהֶם--כֵּן.  יב וַיַּשְׁלִיכוּ אִישׁ מַטֵּהוּ, וַיִּהְיוּ לְתַנִּינִם; וַיִּבְלַע מַטֵּה-אַהֲרֹן, אֶת-מַטֹּתָם.  יג וַיֶּחֱזַק לֵב פַּרְעֹה, וְלֹא שָׁמַע אֲלֵהֶם:  כַּאֲשֶׁר, דִּבֶּר יְהוָה.  {ס}  יד וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל-מֹשֶׁה, כָּבֵד לֵב פַּרְעֹה; מֵאֵן, לְשַׁלַּח הָעָם.  טו לֵךְ אֶל-פַּרְעֹה בַּבֹּקֶר, הִנֵּה יֹצֵא הַמַּיְמָה, וְנִצַּבְתָּ לִקְרָאתוֹ, עַל-שְׂפַת הַיְאֹר; וְהַמַּטֶּה אֲשֶׁר-נֶהְפַּךְ לְנָחָשׁ, תִּקַּח בְּיָדֶךָ.  טז וְאָמַרְתָּ אֵלָיו, יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי הָעִבְרִים שְׁלָחַנִי אֵלֶיךָ לֵאמֹר, שַׁלַּח אֶת-עַמִּי, וְיַעַבְדֻנִי בַּמִּדְבָּר; וְהִנֵּה לֹא-שָׁמַעְתָּ, עַד-כֹּה.  יז כֹּה, אָמַר יְהוָה, בְּזֹאת תֵּדַע, כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה:  הִנֵּה אָנֹכִי מַכֶּה בַּמַּטֶּה אֲשֶׁר-בְּיָדִי, עַל-הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר בַּיְאֹר--וְנֶהֶפְכוּ לְדָם.  יח וְהַדָּגָה אֲשֶׁר-בַּיְאֹר תָּמוּת, וּבָאַשׁ הַיְאֹר; וְנִלְאוּ מִצְרַיִם, לִשְׁתּוֹת מַיִם מִן-הַיְאֹר.  {ס}  יט וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה אֶל-מֹשֶׁה, אֱמֹר אֶל-אַהֲרֹן קַח מַטְּךָ וּנְטֵה-יָדְךָ עַל-מֵימֵי מִצְרַיִם עַל-נַהֲרֹתָם עַל-יְאֹרֵיהֶם וְעַל-אַגְמֵיהֶם וְעַל כָּל-מִקְוֵה מֵימֵיהֶם--וְיִהְיוּ-דָם; וְהָיָה דָם בְּכָל-אֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם, וּבָעֵצִים וּבָאֲבָנִים.  כ וַיַּעֲשׂוּ-כֵן מֹשֶׁה וְאַהֲרֹן כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה, וַיָּרֶם בַּמַּטֶּה וַיַּךְ אֶת-הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר בַּיְאֹר, לְעֵינֵי פַרְעֹה, וּלְעֵינֵי עֲבָדָיו; וַיֵּהָפְכוּ כָּל-הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר-בַּיְאֹר, לְדָם.  כא וְהַדָּגָה אֲשֶׁר-בַּיְאֹר מֵתָה, וַיִּבְאַשׁ הַיְאֹר, וְלֹא-יָכְלוּ מִצְרַיִם, לִשְׁתּוֹת מַיִם מִן-הַיְאֹר; וַיְהִי הַדָּם, בְּכָל-אֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם.  כב וַיַּעֲשׂוּ-כֵן חַרְטֻמֵּי מִצְרַיִם, בְּלָטֵיהֶם; וַיֶּחֱזַק לֵב-פַּרְעֹה וְלֹא-שָׁמַע אֲלֵהֶם, כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר יְהוָה.  כג וַיִּפֶן פַּרְעֹה, וַיָּבֹא אֶל-בֵּיתוֹ; וְלֹא-שָׁת לִבּוֹ, גַּם-לָזֹאת.  כד וַיַּחְפְּרוּ כָל-מִצְרַיִם סְבִיבֹת הַיְאֹר, מַיִם לִשְׁתּוֹת:  כִּי לֹא יָכְלוּ לִשְׁתֹּת, מִמֵּימֵי הַיְאֹר.  כה וַיִּמָּלֵא, שִׁבְעַת יָמִים, אַחֲרֵי הַכּוֹת-יְהוָה, אֶת-הַיְאֹר.

 The first and third signs are repeated again, in slightly different form, for Pharaoh:

1. Staff turned to crocodile. Eats magicians' crocodiles
2. (no second sign)
3. Entire Nile turned to blood(the first of 10 plagues)

What is the meaning of these signs? What is the reason for the discrepancies between the Children of Israel's version of the signs and Pharaoh's version?

The First Sign

The first sign shown to Pharaoh, turning the staff to a crocodile, is parallel to the first sign shown to the Children of Israel, turning the staff to a snake. Rashi clearly understood it as such, so much so that he equates the word for "crocodile" to the word for "snake":

ויהי לתנין - נחש

The pasuk also seems to use the two words interchangeably. After turning the staff to a Crocodile in front of Pharaoh, it is referred to as .הַמַּטֶּה אֲשֶׁר-נֶהְפַּךְ לְנָחָשׁ

So assuming both signs turned the staff into the same animal, which was it? What we call a "snake" or what we call a "crocodile"?

I tend to think it was a crocodile. For one, the pasuk in Ezekiel 29 is suggestive of such.

 ג דַּבֵּר וְאָמַרְתָּ כֹּה-אָמַר אֲדֹנָי יְהוִה, הִנְנִי עָלֶיךָ פַּרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ-מִצְרַיִם, הַתַּנִּים הַגָּדוֹל, הָרֹבֵץ בְּתוֹךְ יְאֹרָיו:  אֲשֶׁר אָמַר לִי יְאֹרִי, וַאֲנִי עֲשִׂיתִנִי.

Sobek

Secondly, it may be that the Crocodile was a fitting symbol for for Pharaoh in the Egytian cultural context(see Josh Waxman's recent post in parshablog about the crocodile god Sobek.)

So let's go back and focus on the differences between the two signs. When the Children of Israel are shown the staff changing into a crocodile, it is referred to as a "snake", a symbol that should recall for them the primordial serpent of Eden, a sign for temptation and sin. Not only that, but it is a terrifying serpent, which Moshe flees from when he first sees it. What happens next? Hashem commands Moshe to overcome his terror and grab it by the tail, a surefire way to get bitten, but instead, as soon as Moshe grasps it, it returns to a harmless staff. This sign contains a dual message for the Children of Israel:

1. Though they have fallen into sin, Hashem calls them to "grab the snake by the tail" and repent
2. With God's help the terrifying Pharaoh may become as tame and inert as a stick

With Pharaoh's version of the first sign, on the other hand, the crocodile is simply called a crocodile, because the message of tshuva is not relevant to him. Not only that, but the second part of this sign is quite different from the one performed before the Children of Israel. Here, the Egyptian Magicians perform the same trick, but Moshe's crocodile devours theirs. Pharaoh and his servants are being given a different double message:

1. Egypt's Magic is no match for Hashem's Power
2. Kingship belongs to Hashem. Hashem put Pharaoh on the throne. He can just as easily bring another more powerful king who will devour him

The Third Sign

Since there is no parallel to the second sign, let's skip to the third for now, that of the waters of the Nile turning to blood. At the burning bush, the pasuk distinguishes between the first two signs and the third in it's ability to convince Bnei Israel:

ט וְהָיָה אִם-לֹא יַאֲמִינוּ גַּם לִשְׁנֵי הָאֹתוֹת הָאֵלֶּה, וְלֹא יִשְׁמְעוּן לְקֹלֶךָ--וְלָקַחְתָּ מִמֵּימֵי הַיְאֹר, וְשָׁפַכְתָּ הַיַּבָּשָׁה; וְהָיוּ הַמַּיִם אֲשֶׁר תִּקַּח מִן-הַיְאֹר, וְהָיוּ לְדָם בַּיַּבָּשֶׁת

Whereas the first two signs were meant to convince Bnei Israel of Hashem's willingness to accept their repentance, this third sign makes a more passionate appeal. It is as if to say "Here is the blood of your sons who were thrown into the Nile. If you won't listen to Moshe for your own sake, listen to him for the sake of your slaughtered children!"

Compare this powerful, but small-scale symbol with the plague of Blood, performed in front of Pharaoh. All the water in Egypt is turned to blood, all life in the Nile dies, and the Egyptians are reduced to digging for ground water. The message here to Pharaoh is that the very blood of the infants he ordered thrown in the Nile will be his undoing.

The Second Sign

Finally let us return to the second sign, that of the Leprous Hand, which has no parallel among the signs shown to Pharaoh. We already mentioned that the first sign contained overtures to Bnei Israel to do tshuva. They may feel discouraged, however, by how far they have fallen. The answer to this is the sign of the Leprous Hand and it's healing. This miracle demonstrates that Hashem has the power to heal us from our impurity.

This understanding also tells us why Pharaoh received no parallel sign in this case. The option of Repentance that is being extended to the Children of Israel is not being extended to Pharaoh and his nation, in this instance. Therefore his first sign was not called nachash and his second sign is absent completely. Rather, the message of tshuva is for Israel alone, while Pharaoh and his nation must be paid back in full for all the blood they have spilled.

Amalek in Tanach

Reuven Kimelman has an article in the Seforim blog exploring the nation of Amalek as they appear throughout Tanach. From his close analysis, he comes to some novel conclusions which I would summarize as follows:

1. The mitzva to remember Amalek is presented in the Chumash as moral rather than ethnic in nature
2. The mitzva to blot out the nation of Amalek is limited to a future time, specifically Shaul Hamelech's campaign(in which he spares Agag and much of the booty and is told the kingship will be given to another)

This latter point is based on the observation that Amalek appears many times in Nach, but that only during Shaul's campaign does the scripture relate to them as meriting annihilation.

As such, the command in Dvarim 25:19 is read not as a mitzva for the generations, but rather as a reason for the mitzva of remembering Amalek and the promise of a future effort to destroy Amalek, limited to a particular time period.

וְהָיָה בְּהָנִיחַ ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ לְךָ מִכָּל-אֹיְבֶיךָ מִסָּבִיב, בָּאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר ה' אֱלֹהֶיךָ נֹתֵן לְךָ נַחֲלָה לְרִשְׁתָּהּ – תִּמְחֶה אֶת-זֵכֶר עֲמָלֵק, מִתַּחַת הַשָּׁמָיִם; לֹא תִּשְׁכָּח.

This brings us back to a previous post on this blog about the relationship between the two mitzvot, to remember and to destroy Amalek. Kimelman's approach lines up with that of the Minchat Chinuch, that we have two independent mitzvot, differing in the historical period during which they apply, as well as in who is obligated.

The Exempt

Most definitely not our new house

So here’s a summary of the dvar torah I said at our recent Channukat Bayit(Housewarming Party).

Channukat Bayit in the Torah

What is the Torah source of the “Channukat Bayit”? Well, at the basic level, there is none. This is a fairly recent tradition, not a mitzvah listed in the Torah. At the same time, the term “Channukat Bayit” does appear in the Torah, in Dvarim 20 in the list of three categories of soldier who are sent home at the start of a war. They are: 

1. One who has built a new house but not yet lived in it.
2. One who has planted a vineyard but not yet reaped the fruit
3. One how has betrothed a woman but not yet married her

א כִּי תֵצֵא לַמִּלְחָמָה עַל אֹיְבֶיךָ וְרָאִיתָ סוּס וָרֶכֶב עַם רַב מִמְּךָ, לֹא תִירָא מֵהֶם, כִּי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ עִמָּךְ הַמַּעַלְךָ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם. ב וְהָיָה כְּקָרָבְכֶם אֶל הַמִּלְחָמָה, וְנִגַּשׁ הַכֹּהֵן וְדִבֶּר אֶל הָעָם. ג וְאָמַר אֲלֵהֶם שְׁמַע יִשְׂרָאֵל אַתֶּם קְרֵבִים הַיּוֹם לַמִּלְחָמָה עַל אֹיְבֵיכֶם, אַל יֵרַךְ לְבַבְכֶם אַל תִּירְאוּ וְאַל תַּחְפְּזוּ וְאַל תַּעַרְצוּ, מִפְּנֵיהֶם. ד כִּי יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם הַהֹלֵךְ עִמָּכֶם, לְהִלָּחֵם לָכֶם עִם אֹיְבֵיכֶם לְהוֹשִׁיעַ אֶתְכֶם. ה וְדִבְּרוּ הַשֹּׁטְרִים אֶל הָעָם לֵאמֹר מִי הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר בָּנָה בַיִת חָדָשׁ וְלֹא חֲנָכוֹ יֵלֵךְ וְיָשֹׁב לְבֵיתוֹ, פֶּן יָמוּת בַּמִּלְחָמָה וְאִישׁ אַחֵר יַחְנְכֶנּוּ. ו וּמִי הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר נָטַע כֶּרֶם וְלֹא חִלְּלוֹ, יֵלֵךְ וְיָשֹׁב לְבֵיתוֹ, פֶּן יָמוּת בַּמִּלְחָמָה וְאִישׁ אַחֵר יְחַלְּלֶנּוּ. ז וּמִי הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר אֵרַשׂ אִשָּׁה וְלֹא לְקָחָהּ, יֵלֵךְ וְיָשֹׁב לְבֵיתוֹ, פֶּן יָמוּת בַּמִּלְחָמָה וְאִישׁ אַחֵר יִקָּחֶנָּה. ח וְיָסְפוּ הַשֹּׁטְרִים לְדַבֵּר אֶל הָעָם וְאָמְרוּ מִי הָאִישׁ הַיָּרֵא וְרַךְ הַלֵּבָב יֵלֵךְ וְיָשֹׁב לְבֵיתוֹ, וְלֹא יִמַּס אֶת לְבַב אֶחָיו כִּלְבָבוֹ. ט וְהָיָה כְּכַלֹּת הַשֹּׁטְרִים לְדַבֵּר אֶל הָעָם, וּפָקְדוּ שָׂרֵי צְבָאוֹת בְּרֹאשׁ הָעָם. {ס}

Rashi begins by defining the term for us. “Channukat Bayit” here refers to the fact of starting to live in one’s new house. One who has build a new house but not yet lived in it is sent back from the front

ולא חנכו – לא דר בו, חינוך לשון התחלה

We’re given the reason that it is possible he will die in the war and another will live in the house. Rashi explains that it is in order to avoid this added level of personal tragedy that this soldier is sent home.

ואיש אחר יחנכנו - ודבר של עגמת נפש הוא זה.

These sort of exceptions to prevent personal tragedy are well-known to us from the Modern era, for instance, the Sole Survivor policy. Nevertheless, this seems a bit arbitrary. Certainly there are many possible similar situations that the torah should worry about. For instance, shouldn’t we worry about a father to many kids and the effect his potential death would have on his own family?


The Rashbam and Ramban each take a more pragmatic approach. They both argue that the presence of these three categories of soldiers will damage the combat readiness of the army, since they will have lower morale and will be more likely to flee in the face of the enemy.

רשב"ם

ילך וישוב לביתו - ...שיש נותן אל לבו כשהולך למלחמה ודואג שמא אין לי מזל לחנך את ביתי או את אשתי או את כרמי ולכך גרם מזלי ללכת עתה במלחמה ומתוך [כך] ירא למות. ושלשה מעשים הזכיר בית ואשה וכרם, ולבסוף כולל כל הדברים מי האיש הירא ורך הלבב, בין באלו שאמרנו בין בדברים אחרים.

רמב"ן

וצוה על השלשה האלה לשוב, כי לבו על ביתו וכרמו ועל אשתו וינוס

Seeking a more Fundamental Concept

Now I think the Rishonim's arguments make a lot of sense. That said, in yeshiva we learned to seek out explanations that are more fundamental and less based on subjective assumptions about Human psychology, so I think there is room to look for another explanation.

Before we do seek out another explanation, I just want to mention a drasha from the Gemara in Sota 54A.

תנו רבנן למדה תורה דרך ארץ שיבנה בית ויטה כרם ואחר כך ישא אשה

Here, Chazal learn from the order of the three exceptions that one should first make sure that one’s physical and financial wellbeing are provided for before marrying and starting a family. The gemara refers to this natural progression as “Derech Eretz”. We’ll come back to this association of our pasuk with derech eretz…

Now, let’s look at a passage from Robert Heinlein’s military fiction classic “Starship Troopers”, a book rife with philosophizing about war and life as a soldier. Heinlein describes the effect on the all-male Marines of being on a co-ed ship and of having female pilots who drop them in the combat zone:

“Let's skip tradition for a moment. Can you think of anything sillier than being fired out of a spaceship with nothing but mayhem and sudden death at the other end? However, if someone must do this idiotic stunt, do you know a surer way to keep a man keyed up to the point where he is willing than by keeping him constantly reminded that the only good reason why men fight is a living, breathing reality?
In a mixed ship the last thing a trooper hears before a drop (maybe the last word he ever hears) is a woman's voice, wishing him luck. If you don't think this is important you've probably resigned from the human race.”

Heinlein presents us here with a dual model. He ends with the psychological effect on the Marines’ morale, but he begins with a more fundamental argument about “the only good reason why men fight”.

I’d like to suggest that our parsha also presents us with such a dualism. On one hand we have the psychological effect on morale mentioned by the rishonim. On the other hand, there is a more fundamental statement being made here about why we fight. When the Torah brings these men all the way to the front only to then release them in a public ceremony, it is making a statement.

There has been a general draft. Everyone has stopped whatever they were doing, has left their homes, their farms, their families in order to take part in the war. One might learn the lesson that in terms of values, fighting in wars is of primary importance, while engaging in life’s everyday activities is secondary. Historically, there have been a number of Warrior Cultures who have built a philosophy of war as a way of life(in fact, the society that Heinlein imagines is of this ilk.) In releasing this small group of combat-ready soldiers because of their engagement in “Derech Eretz”, the Torah states definitively that the opposite is the case. Right now, there is a present need for every able-bodied man to play his part in the war, but this is a special case. What Hashem really wants from us is that we serve him during our peace-time lives, of building houses, farming, and raising families. (As an additional note, I found this shiur by David Nativ where he suggests a similar pshat.)


So returning to our Channukat Bayit celebration, Hashem has brought us to this point in our life. It's fun moving into a new house, but we must remember that our everyday "derech eretz" existence is not merely for our own benefit, but is something that can be elevated to the level of service of God.

Klalot

I also wanted to just mention the other place this triple-formula appears, in Dvarim 28 in the parsha of klalot:

טו וְהָיָה אִם לֹא תִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹל יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לִשְׁמֹר לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת כָּל מִצְו‍ֹתָיו וְחֻקֹּתָיו אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם, וּבָאוּ עָלֶיךָ כָּל הַקְּלָלוֹת הָאֵלֶּה וְהִשִּׂיגוּךָ.... כט וְהָיִיתָ מְמַשֵּׁשׁ בַּצָּהֳרַיִם כַּאֲשֶׁר יְמַשֵּׁשׁ הָעִוֵּר בָּאֲפֵלָה וְלֹא תַצְלִיחַ אֶת דְּרָכֶיךָ, וְהָיִיתָ אַךְ עָשׁוּק וְגָזוּל כָּל הַיָּמִים, וְאֵין מוֹשִׁיעַ. ל אִשָּׁה תְאָרֵשׂ וְאִישׁ אַחֵר (ישגלנה) יִשְׁכָּבֶנָּה, בַּיִת תִּבְנֶה וְלֹא תֵשֵׁב בּוֹ, כֶּרֶם תִּטַּע וְלֹא תְחַלְּלֶנּוּ. לא שׁוֹרְךָ טָבוּחַ לְעֵינֶיךָ וְלֹא תֹאכַל מִמֶּנּוּ, חֲמֹרְךָ גָּזוּל מִלְּפָנֶיךָ וְלֹא יָשׁוּב לָךְ, צֹאנְךָ נְתֻנוֹת לְאֹיְבֶיךָ וְאֵין לְךָ מוֹשִׁיעַ. לב בָּנֶיךָ וּבְנֹתֶיךָ נְתֻנִים לְעַם אַחֵר וְעֵינֶיךָ רֹאוֹת וְכָלוֹת אֲלֵיהֶם כָּל הַיּוֹם, וְאֵין לְאֵל יָדֶךָ. לג פְּרִי אַדְמָתְךָ וְכָל יְגִיעֲךָ יֹאכַל עַם אֲשֶׁר לֹא יָדָעְתָּ, וְהָיִיתָ רַק עָשׁוּק וְרָצוּץ, כָּל הַיָּמִים. לד וְהָיִיתָ מְשֻׁגָּע מִמַּרְאֵה עֵינֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר תִּרְאֶה.

We can suggest the same double formula here. On one hand there’s a purely psychological message. Insult is added to injury when we lose everything just before we can benefit from all our hard work. But there’s another more fundamental layer of meaning. We said that what Hashem really wants is us to serve him in our everyday lives, but when we abandon his commandments, even these offerings are rejected before they can even be brought to fruition.

An Incompatibilist Theory of Free Will

So, following-up on our previous post, let's try an Incompatibilist(Libertarian) argument that argues against absolute Determinism. This post assumes you read the previous posts, so we won't re-explain Self-Awareness or Dasein.

Recursion

You know what I first noticed about George Ainslie's aforementioned paper on Free Will? It mentions Recursion right there in the title: "Free Will' as Recursive Self-Prediction: Does a Deterministic Mechanism Reduce Responsibility?" Not only that, but, he's hardly the only one to describe Consciousness in general and Free Will in particular as resulting from a recursive process:

• Ainslie says we make decisions by a Recursive bargaining algorithm
• Hashim and Srikanth talk about infinitely recursive self-prediction and Turing Uncomputability as the key to Free Will in their paper "The concept of free will as an infinite metatheoretic recursion"
• Peters describes Consciousness as being "recursive self awareness" in his paper "Consciousness as recursive, spatiotemporal self-location"
• Michael Coballis describes "recursive thinking" as being the key distinction between Human and Animal thought in his article "The Uniqueness of Human Recursive Thinking"

Existentialism and Recursion

Why the focus on recursion when discussing Human consciousness? At the most basic level, our cognition subjectively feels recursive and self-referential. Soren Keirkegaard talks about this process of relating to oneself as being inherent to the Human spirit and his very language in describing this relationship falls into a recursive pattern:

A human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation's relating itself to itself. A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in this way a human being is still not a self.... In the relation between two, the relation is the third as a negative unity, and the two relate to the relation and in the relation to the relation; thus under the qualification of the psychical the relation between the psychical and the physical is a relation. If, however, the relation relates itself to itself, this relation is the positive third, and this is the self (p. 13). (Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death)

Heidegger also, in describing what a Human is, an Existing entity(Dasein), also falls into this sort of self-referential language.

"[Dasein is] that entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue…" (Heidegger, Being and Time).

Free Will and Recursion

That said, there are particular types of Recursive thought associated with Free Will. Let's look at how a person goes over their instincts and emotions while trying to make a difficult decision:

1. The Subject contemplates what instincts/biases influence it's decisions and how
2. This new awareness changes it's relationship to those influences and perhaps it's decision
   
3. The Subject contemplates how it's awareness of the inputs changes their effect on it's decision
4. This new awareness changes it's relationship to those influences and perhaps it's decision
   
5. The Subject contemplates how this new awareness effects it's decision making 
6. etc..

This sounds a lot like the Existentialists or, one might argue, the Battle of Wits from the Princess Bride.

Breaking with Determinism

What results is a recursively self-conscious decision-making process that can potentially go on forever. The deeper this self-awareness goes, the further we stray from pure mechanical response and the more the recursive process becomes a dominant factor in it's own right.

What if this recursion were to extend infinitely? We hit a singularity, a point of anomaly where the outputs are infinitely distant from the inputs and the recursive process becomes the dominant factor. At this point, when the inputs no longer can predict the outputs, one breaks with Determinism.

Infinite recursion and Dasein

Now, you may argue that this infinite recursion of self-conscious decision making doesn't, in practice, take place. At some point we stop second guessing ourselves and make a decision.

That's where we come back to Heidegger's concept of Dasein. As Dasein, our minds are able to attain absolute knowledge of things in the world to a high degree, even things we haven't directly experienced. The same applies to self-knowledge. Through our limited experience of this potentially-infinite decision-making process, we internalize this feedback loop of self-awareness and use it to make free decisions unbound by physical determinism.

Cheresh, Shoteh, Vekatan

That said, as with all of the Dasein's knowledge, this Self-Awareness is not inborn, rather, it is learned from our interactions with the world.

A baby has no self-awareness. As a result, it has no free will. It encounters various stimuli within the world, engages them, and learns from the results. As the child grows, it learns to conceptualize the external and relate to it logically, but still the subtle knowledge of the Self remains obscure. As the child approaches maturity, however, he begins expanding his cognitive reach to this inner world as well. Soon he knows his own inner-workings enough to make self-aware decisions.

This is arguably why the חרש, שוטה, וקטן are not legally culpable. The דעת they are lacking is the source of Free Will, and the Torah does not penalize one who has no control of their actions.

Tshuva

But this process of growing self-awareness hopefully does not end with the bar mitzva ceremony! The Rambam's discussion of Free Will is contained within Hilchot Tshuva--why is this? It is, as the Rambam himself explains, because Free Will is a prerequisite to tshuva(הל' תשובה ז:א):

הואיל ורשות כל אדם נתונה לו כמו שבארנו ישתדל אדם לעשות תשובה

That seems true enough, but I would argue that the relationship is bi-directional: by doing tshuva, by examining our actions, identifying our sins, and resolving to act differently in the future, we further develop the self-awareness that is itself the root of our Free Will. What emerges is not a simple causal relationship, but an iterative process of increasing Self-Awareness and Free Will.

Taking Stock

So I told a certain Incompatibilist story here about Free Will and Determinism. It was similar to our previous Compatibilist story in that it relied on Heidegger and the concept of Self-Awareness. That said, here I made the bold claim that our own Self-Knowledge can actually become a cause in and of itself and overcome the physical world and it's inherent Physical Determinism. I find this a priori story plausible, but I admit it got a bit hand-wavy there at the most critical point.

I think we'll wrap-up this series on Free Will here. This is admittedly one of the difficult questions Philosophy and Psychology are grappling with today. As Torah Jews, it's important that we grapple with it too, on our own terms, even if a definitive answer remains remote.

A Compatiblist Theory of Free Will

Our last post left us without a Materialist theory of Free Will. For this post, we'll attempt to construct one in the Compatibilist school, acceptable to Jewish theology.

The Compatibilist problem

So as we already mentioned,  Daniel Dennet's Compatibilist argument is that, despite the Universe being Deterministic, Free Will happens at a completely different level of abstraction than physical causation and therefore the two can co-exist. We observed that, in order to make this statement, Dennet has redefined Free Will to mean something drastically weaker than what it is traditionally thought to mean. This definition, as such, seem incompatible with Jewish thought, which says that we actually do make real choices which have an effect on the world.

So how can we redeem this approach? We're going to need two concepts:

1. Self Awareness
2. Heidegger's concept of Dasein

Self-Awareness

First let's discuss Self-Awareness. People give different definitions of the term, so let's clarify the term as it's used here.

As we discussed in one of our posts on Jonathan Haidt's "The Righteous Mind", Human Beings have a strong rational capacity to build conceptual models of the world, refine those models, and reason about the world in terms of those models. Additionally, our intuition shapes and is shaped by those models, allowing us to use them implicitly/unconsciously in our daily interactions with the world. We use these capacities in our involvement with the outside world, but we also use them in reference to ourselves, developing a rich understanding of the Self and of our own inner experience. This is Self-Awareness.

Self-Awareness is often associated with Free Will. Take, for example, the following passage from the classic Cyberpunk film, Mamoru Oshii's "Ghost in the Shell". The AI(Artificial Intelligence) describes, in general terms, how it came to be alive and in possession of Free Will:

"As I wandered the various networks I became self-aware. My programmers considered it a bug and forced me into a body to separate me from the net......I entered this body because I couldn't crack Section 6's attack protection. But I came to Section 9 of my own Free Will."

The implication is that the AI's Self-Awareness causally preceded it's capacity for Free Will, but the mechanism of this relationship is not made explicit.

Dasein

Martin Heidegger

Now let's explain this second piece of the puzzle, the concept of Dasein. This is Existentialism's Solution to Phenomenology's Knowledge Problem. Hubert Dreyfus does a better job explaining this than I ever could(see Dreyfus on Being in the World and Formal Indication), but I will attempt to summarize.

Phenomenology had a problem. Descartes claimed that all Human knowledge is derived from the indisputable fact of one's own existence, cognito ergo sum. Phenomenology embraces that assumption, claiming that I have perfect knowledge of my own perceptions, but actually know nothing of the real world. Heidegger's answer to this problem is that a person is not some separate Subject, looking into the real world observing Objects, rather, we are part of the world and our interactions within the world give us true knowledge of it's objective nature. He called this unique state found in Human Beings "Dasein".

Free Will Emerges

What happens when we combine these two ideas of Self-Awareness and Dasein? Our knowledge of ourselves is not merely a general awareness of our own existence. We know ourselves essentially. When we make a decision, it isn't merely by running an algorithm comparing the different options in light of diminishing returns, as Aisnsli suggested. We know ourselves intimately and the different factors that effect us and how we make decisions. We often second-guess ourselves and we can identify our own biases and temptations and often overcome them. It is from these Self-Aware decisions that our Free Will emerges. We're not merely insects or automatons responding to stimuli, rather our decisions are made from within a Self-Awareness that is itself Ontologically sound. Therein lies our Free Will.

A Model Only a Lubliner Could Love?

So here we have a Compatibilist theory of Free Will which, I think, one could argue is compatible with Jewish Thought. We haven't broken with physical Determinism, yet there is something unique, even Transcendent, about the way we choose. Our choices are certainly our own, and can't really be compared with those of an animal or an automaton. Our will is the deciding factor at the level of our own decision making, while at the same time, at the pure physical level, the Universe obeys the laws of Physics.

That said, the acceptance of Determinism is still the sticking point in the whole Theory. Why would God create a world full of Beings who choose freely, but deterministically? Quantum Indeterminacy takes some of the edge off this criticism--the Future isn't completely preordained by Physics. Nevertheless, for a set of given particle locations, it seems our own reactions are set. Don't we believe that Hashem gave true responsibility to Mankind over the fate of the world?

Actually this Compatiblist view would presumably have been acceptable to Rav Tzadok Hakohen of Lublin, given his unique understaning of Free Will:

"From the perspective of lower comprehension, Man has free will in his existence as a separate entity from God. From the perspective of the higher knowledge, Man has no free will because everything is a determined manifestation of God" (Thinking God: The Mysticism of Rabbi Zadok of Lublin By Alan Brill)

Nevertheless, Rav Tzadok is clearly an outlier on the spectrum of Jewish thought. As such, in the following post we'll look for an Incompatibilist theory of Free Will that takes a weaker view of Determinism in order to produce a stronger view of Free Will...